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15th WINE 2019: New York, NY, USA
- Ioannis Caragiannis, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Evdokia Nikolova:
Web and Internet Economics - 15th International Conference, WINE 2019, New York, NY, USA, December 10-12, 2019, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 11920, Springer 2019, ISBN 978-3-030-35388-9
Regular Papers
- Ben Abramowitz, Elliot Anshelevich, Wennan Zhu:
Awareness of Voter Passion Greatly Improves the Distortion of Metric Social Choice. 3-16 - Gagan Aggarwal, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Aranyak Mehta:
Autobidding with Constraints. 17-30 - Saeed Alaei, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Mohammad Mahdian, Sadra Yazdanbod:
Response Prediction for Low-Regret Agents. 31-44 - Jerry Anunrojwong, Yiling Chen, Bo Waggoner, Haifeng Xu:
Computing Equilibria of Prediction Markets via Persuasion. 45-56 - Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran, Siddharth Barman, Rachitesh Kumar, Nidhi Rathi:
Fair and Efficient Cake Division with Connected Pieces. 57-70 - Moshe Babaioff, Uriel Feige:
A New Approach to Fair Distribution of Welfare. 71-84 - Victor Boone, Georgios Piliouras:
From Darwin to Poincaré and von Neumann: Recurrence and Cycles in Evolutionary and Algorithmic Game Theory. 85-99 - Felix Brandt, Anaëlle Wilczynski:
On the Convergence of Swap Dynamics to Pareto-Optimal Matchings. 100-113 - Avi Cohen, David Peleg:
Hotelling Games with Random Tolerance Intervals. 114-128 - Michael J. Curry, John P. Dickerson, Karthik Abinav Sankararaman, Aravind Srinivasan, Yuhao Wan, Pan Xu:
Mix and Match: Markov Chains and Mixing Times for Matching in Rideshare. 129-141 - Shaddin Dughmi, Rad Niazadeh, Alexandros Psomas, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of Duality. 142-155 - Hagen Echzell, Tobias Friedrich, Pascal Lenzner, Louise Molitor, Marcus Pappik, Friedrich Schöne, Fabian Sommer, David Stangl:
Convergence and Hardness of Strategic Schelling Segregation. 156-170 - Diodato Ferraioli, Adrian Meier, Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre:
Automated Optimal OSP Mechanisms for Set Systems - The Case of Small Domains. 171-185 - Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Philip Lazos:
The Pareto Frontier of Inefficiency in Mechanism Design. 186-199 - Eirini Georgoulaki, Kostas Kollias:
On the Price of Anarchy of Cost-Sharing in Real-Time Scheduling Systems. 200-213 - Alexandros Hollender:
The Classes PPA-k: Existence from Arguments Modulo k. 214-227 - Yaonan Jin, Weian Li, Qi Qi:
On the Approximability of Simple Mechanisms for MHR Distributions. 228-240 - Pieter Kleer, Guido Schäfer:
Topological Price of Anarchy Bounds for Clustering Games on Networks. 241-255 - Yuqing Kong, Chris Peikert, Grant Schoenebeck, Biaoshuai Tao:
Outsourcing Computation: The Minimal Refereed Mechanism. 256-270 - Evangelos Markakis, Artem Tsikiridis:
On Core-Selecting and Core-Competitive Mechanisms for Binary Single-Parameter Auctions. 271-285 - Marc Schröder, Tami Tamir, Vipin Ravindran Vijayalakshmi:
Scheduling Games with Machine-Dependent Priority Lists. 286-300 - Zhenzhe Zheng, R. Srikant:
Optimal Search Segmentation Mechanisms for Online Platform Markets. 301-315 - Carme Àlvarez, Arnau Messegué:
On the Price of Anarchy for High-Price Links. 316-329
Abstracts
- AmirMahdi Ahmadinejad, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Amin Saberi, Nolan Skochdopole, Kane Sweeney:
Competition in Ride-Hailing Markets. 333 - Jerry Anunrojwong, Krishnamurthy Iyer, David Lingenbrink:
Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach. 334 - Itai Ashlagi, Süleyman Kerimov:
Scrip Systems with Minimal Availability. 335 - Haris Aziz, Hau Chan, Barton E. Lee, David C. Parkes:
The Capacity Constrained Facility Location Problem. 336 - Roberto Cominetti, Valerio Dose, Marco Scarsini:
The Price of Anarchy in Routing Games as a Function of the Demand. 337 - Adam N. Elmachtoub, Vishal Gupta, Michael L. Hamilton:
The Value of Personalized Pricing. 338 - Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili, Oriol Tejada:
Sophisticated Attacks on Decoy Ballots: A Devil's Menu. 339 - Ashish Goel, Reyna Hulett, Benjamin Plaut:
Markets Beyond Nash Welfare for Leontief Utilities. 340 - Tobias Harks, Anja Schedel:
Capacity and Price Competition in Markets with Congestion Effects. 341 - Nicole Immorlica, Benjamin Plaut, E. Glen Weyl:
Equality of Power and Fair Public Decision-Making. 342 - Thomas Kesselheim, Alexandros Psomas, Shai Vardi:
How to Hire Secretaries with Stochastic Departures. 343 - Ilan Nehama:
Almost Quasi-linear Utilities in Disguise: Positive-Representation an Extension of Roberts' Theorem. 344-345 - Pu Yang, Krishnamurthy Iyer, Peter I. Frazier:
Information Design in Spatial Resource Competition. 346
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