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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 120
Volume 120, March 2020
- Simon Loertscher

, Leslie M. Marx:
A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism. 1-15
- Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky:

Identifiable information structures. 16-27
- Pierpaolo Battigalli

, Roberto Corrao, Federico Sanna:
Epistemic game theory without types structures: An application to psychological games. 28-57
- Nicola Doni, Domenico Menicucci:

On the optimal entry fee and reserve price for auctions with selective entry: A comment on Gentry, Li, Lu (2017). 58-66
- Sara Negrelli:

Bubbles and persuasion with uncertainty over market sentiment. 67-85 - Ching-Jen Sun

:
A sandwich theorem for generic n × n two person games. 86-95 - Drew Fudenberg, Kevin He

:
Payoff information and learning in signaling games. 96-120
- Evan Sadler

:
Innovation adoption and collective experimentation. 121-131
- Isabelle Brocas, Juan D. Carrillo

:
The evolution of choice and learning in the two-person beauty contest game from kindergarten to adulthood. 132-143 - F. Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz

, Carles Rafels, Neus Ybern:
Assortative multisided assignment games: The extreme core points. 144-153 - Emiliano Catonini

, Nicodemo De Vito:
Weak belief and permissibility. 154-179 - Jingsheng Yu, Jun Zhang

:
A market design approach to job rotation. 180-192 - Yutaka Kayaba

, Hitoshi Matsushima
, Tomohisa Toyama:
Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: Experiments. 193-208 - Emiliano Catonini

:
On non-monotonic strategic reasoning. 209-224 - Erik Mohlin

, Robert Östling
, Joseph Tao-Yi Wang
:
Learning by similarity-weighted imitation in winner-takes-all games. 225-245 - Umut Mert Dur

, Thayer Morrill:
What you don't know can help you in school assignment. 246-256 - Pierfrancesco Guarino:

An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness. 257-288 - Brian Hill:

Dynamic consistency and ambiguity: A reappraisal. 289-310 - Uri Gneezy, Silvia Saccardo

, Marta Serra-Garcia
, Roel van Veldhuizen
:
Bribing the Self. 311-324 - Rakesh Chaturvedi

:
Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly. 325-335 - Max Alston

:
On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information. 336-344 - Benson Tsz Kin Leung

:
Limited cognitive ability and selective information processing. 345-369 - Peter Troyan

, David Delacrétaz
, Andrew Kloosterman:
Essentially stable matchings. 370-390 - Bernardo García-Pola

, Nagore Iriberri
, Jaromír Kovárík
:
Non-equilibrium play in centipede games. 391-433 - João Correia-da-Silva

:
Self-rejecting mechanisms. 434-457

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