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ORCIDItai Arieli
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2020 – today
- 2025
[j21]Gideon Amir
, Itai Arieli, Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Ron Peretz:
Granular DeGroot dynamics - A model for robust naive learning in social networks. J. Econ. Theory 223: 105952 (2025)- [j20]Itai Arieli, Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Ron Peretz, Yevgeny Tsodikovich:
Minimal contagious sets: Degree distributional bounds. J. Econ. Theory 226: 106009 (2025) - 2024
- [j19]Itai Arieli, Omer Madmon, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Reputation-based persuasion platforms. Games Econ. Behav. 147: 128-147 (2024) - [j18]Itai Arieli, Srinivas Arigapudi:
Private signals and fast product adoption under incomplete information. Games Econ. Behav. 147: 377-387 (2024) - [j17]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko:
A population's feasible posterior beliefs. J. Econ. Theory 215: 105764 (2024) - [i21]Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Receiver-Oriented Cheap Talk Design. CoRR abs/2401.03671 (2024) - [i20]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Omer Madmon, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Robust Price Discrimination. CoRR abs/2401.16942 (2024) - [i19]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Dimitry Shaiderman, Xianwen Shi:
Persuading while Learning. CoRR abs/2407.13964 (2024) - 2023
- [c20]Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Mediated Cheap Talk Design. AAAI 2023: 5456-5463 - [c19]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Konstantin Zabarnyi:
Universally Robust Information Aggregation for Binary Decisions. EC 2023: 118 - [c18]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Stephan Müller, Farzad Pourbabaee, Omer Tamuz:
The Hazards and Benefits of Condescension in Social Learning. EC 2023: 119 - [c17]Ronen Gradwohl, Itai Arieli, Rann Smorodinsky:
Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk. EC 2023: 813 - [c16]Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Resilient Information Aggregation. TARK 2023: 31-45 - [i18]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Stephan Müller, Farzad Pourbabaee, Omer Tamuz:
The Hazards and Benefits of Condescension in Social Learning. CoRR abs/2301.11237 (2023) - [i17]Itai Arieli, Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky:
Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk. CoRR abs/2302.00281 (2023) - [i16]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Konstantin Zabarnyi:
Universally Robust Information Aggregation for Binary Decisions. CoRR abs/2302.03667 (2023) - [i15]Itai Arieli, Omer Madmon, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Reputation-based Persuasion Platforms. CoRR abs/2305.16694 (2023) - [i14]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy:
Persuasion as Transportation. CoRR abs/2307.07672 (2023) - [i13]Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz:
The Value of Mediation in Long Cheap Talk. CoRR abs/2312.14793 (2023) - 2022
- [j16]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Manuel Mueller-Frank:
Naive Learning Through Probability Overmatching. Oper. Res. 70(6): 3420-3431 (2022) - [c15]Gideon Amir, Itai Arieli, Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Ron Peretz:
Granular DeGroot Dynamics - a Model for Robust Naive Learning in Social Networks. EC 2022: 323-324 - [c14]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko:
A Population's Feasible Posterior Beliefs. EC 2022: 326-327 - [c13]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy:
Persuasion as Transportation. EC 2022: 468 - [c12]Itai Arieli, Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky:
Herd Design. EC 2022: 871-872 - [i12]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko:
A Population's Feasible Posterior Beliefs. CoRR abs/2202.01846 (2022) - [i11]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy:
Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators. CoRR abs/2203.04285 (2022) - [i10]Itai Arieli, Ivan Geffner, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Mediated Cheap Talk Design (with proofs). CoRR abs/2211.14670 (2022) - 2021
- [j15]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Segev Shlomov:
Virtually additive learning. J. Econ. Theory 197: 105322 (2021) - [j14]Itai Arieli, Manuel Mueller-Frank:
A General Analysis of Sequential Social Learning. Math. Oper. Res. 46(4): 1235-1249 (2021) - [j13]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Omer Tamuz:
Feasible joint posterior beliefs (through examples). SIGecom Exch. 19(1): 21-29 (2021) - [c11]Itai Arieli, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Rann Smorodinsky:
On Social Networks that Support Learning. EC 2021: 95-96 - [c10]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Manuel Mueller-Frank:
Sequential Naive Learning. EC 2021: 97 - [i9]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Manuel Mueller-Frank:
Sequential Naive Learning. CoRR abs/2101.02897 (2021) - [i8]Gideon Amir, Itai Arieli, Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Ron Peretz:
Robust Naive Learning in Social Networks. CoRR abs/2102.11768 (2021) - 2020
- [j12]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky:
Identifiable information structures. Games Econ. Behav. 120: 16-27 (2020) - [j11]Gal Bahar, Itai Arieli, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Multi-issue social learning. Math. Soc. Sci. 104: 29-39 (2020) - [c9]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky, Takuro Yamashita:
Optimal Persuasion via Bi-Pooling. EC 2020: 641 - [c8]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Omer Tamuz:
Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs. EC 2020: 643 - [i7]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Omer Tamuz:
Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs. CoRR abs/2002.11362 (2020) - [i6]Itai Arieli, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Rann Smorodinsky:
On social networks that support learning. CoRR abs/2011.05255 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [j10]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko:
Private Bayesian persuasion. J. Econ. Theory 182: 185-217 (2019) - [c7]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Segev Shlomov:
Robust Non-Bayesian Social Learning. EC 2019: 549-550 - [c6]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Manuel Mueller-Frank:
Naive Learning Through Probability Matching. EC 2019: 553 - [c5]Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky:
The Implications of Pricing on Social Learning. EC 2019: 557-558 - [i5]Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky:
The Implications of Pricing on Social Learning. CoRR abs/1905.03452 (2019) - 2018
- [c4]Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky:
The One-Shot Crowdfunding Game. EC 2018: 213-214 - [i4]Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky:
The One-Shot Crowdfunding Game. CoRR abs/1805.11872 (2018) - 2017
- [j9]Itai Arieli, Manuel Mueller-Frank:
Inferring beliefs from actions. Games Econ. Behav. 102: 455-461 (2017) - [j8]Itai Arieli:
Payoff externalities and social learning. Games Econ. Behav. 104: 392-410 (2017) - [j7]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Sequential commitment games. Games Econ. Behav. 105: 297-315 (2017) - [c3]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky:
Forecast Aggregation. EC 2017: 61-62 - [c2]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko:
Simple Approximate Equilibria in Games with Many Players. EC 2017: 681-691 - [c1]Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky:
The Crowdfunding Game. WINE 2017: 398-399 - [i3]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko:
Simple approximate equilibria in games with many players. CoRR abs/1701.07956 (2017) - [i2]Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky:
The Crowdfunding Game. CoRR abs/1710.00319 (2017) - 2016
- [j6]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko:
Random extensive form games. J. Econ. Theory 166: 517-535 (2016) - 2015
- [j5]Itai Arieli:
Transfer Implementation in Congestion Games. Dyn. Games Appl. 5(2): 228-238 (2015) - [j4]Itai Arieli, Yehuda John Levy:
Determinacy of games with Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring. Games Econ. Behav. 91: 166-185 (2015) - [j3]Itai Arieli, Robert J. Aumann:
The logic of backward induction. J. Econ. Theory 159: 443-464 (2015) - [i1]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko:
Random Extensive Form Games and its Application to Bargaining. CoRR abs/1509.02337 (2015) - 2012
- [j2]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko:
Average testing and Pareto efficiency. J. Econ. Theory 147(6): 2376-2398 (2012) - 2011
- [j1]Itai Arieli, Yehuda Levy:
Infinite sequential games with perfect but incomplete information. Int. J. Game Theory 40(2): 207-213 (2011)
Coauthor Index
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