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Sven Seuken
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- affiliation: University of Zurich, Switzerland
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2020 – today
- 2024
- [c56]Michael J. Curry, Vinzenz Thoma, Darshan Chakrabarti, Stephen McAleer, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm, Niao He, Sven Seuken:
Automated Design of Affine Maximizer Mechanisms in Dynamic Settings. AAAI 2024: 9626-9635 - [c55]Ermis Nikiforos Soumalias, Jakob Weissteiner, Jakob Heiss, Sven Seuken:
Machine Learning-Powered Combinatorial Clock Auction. AAAI 2024: 9891-9900 - [c54]Paul Friedrich, Yulun Zhang, Michael J. Curry, Ludwig Dierks, Stephen McAleer, Jiaoyang Li, Tuomas Sandholm, Sven Seuken:
Scalable Mechanism Design for Multi-Agent Path Finding. IJCAI 2024: 58-66 - [i36]Paul Friedrich, Yulun Zhang, Michael J. Curry, Ludwig Dierks, Stephen McAleer, Jiaoyang Li, Tuomas Sandholm, Sven Seuken:
Scalable Mechanism Design for Multi-Agent Path Finding. CoRR abs/2401.17044 (2024) - [i35]Michael J. Curry, Vinzenz Thoma, Darshan Chakrabarti, Stephen McAleer, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm, Niao He, Sven Seuken:
Automated Design of Affine Maximizer Mechanisms in Dynamic Settings. CoRR abs/2402.08129 (2024) - [i34]Ermis Soumalias, Michael J. Curry, Sven Seuken:
Truthful Aggregation of LLMs with an Application to Online Advertising. CoRR abs/2405.05905 (2024) - 2023
- [c53]Jakob Weissteiner, Jakob Heiss, Julien Siems, Sven Seuken:
Bayesian Optimization-Based Combinatorial Assignment. AAAI 2023: 5858-5866 - [i33]Ermis Soumalias, Jakob Weissteiner, Jakob Heiss, Sven Seuken:
Machine Learning-powered Combinatorial Clock Auction. CoRR abs/2308.10226 (2023) - [i32]Vinzenz Thoma, Vitor Bosshard, Sven Seuken:
Computing Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in Sequential Auctions. CoRR abs/2312.04516 (2023) - [i31]Vinzenz Thoma, Michael J. Curry, Niao He, Sven Seuken:
Learning Best Response Policies in Dynamic Auctions via Deep Reinforcement Learning. CoRR abs/2312.13232 (2023) - 2022
- [j8]Benedikt Bünz, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken:
Designing Core-Selecting Payment Rules: A Computational Search Approach. Inf. Syst. Res. 33(4): 1157-1173 (2022) - [j7]Ludwig Dierks, Sven Seuken:
Cloud Pricing: The Spot Market Strikes Back. Manag. Sci. 68(1): 105-122 (2022) - [c52]Sven Seuken, Paul Friedrich, Ludwig Dierks:
Market Design for Drone Traffic Management. AAAI 2022: 12294-12300 - [c51]Jakob Heiss, Jakob Weissteiner, Hanna S. Wutte, Sven Seuken, Josef Teichmann:
NOMU: Neural Optimization-based Model Uncertainty. ICML 2022: 8708-8758 - [c50]Jakob Weissteiner, Jakob Heiss, Julien Siems, Sven Seuken:
Monotone-Value Neural Networks: Exploiting Preference Monotonicity in Combinatorial Assignment. IJCAI 2022: 541-548 - [c49]Jakob Weissteiner, Chris Wendler, Sven Seuken, Benjamin Lubin, Markus Püschel:
Fourier Analysis-based Iterative Combinatorial Auctions. IJCAI 2022: 549-556 - [e1]David M. Pennock, Ilya Segal, Sven Seuken:
EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11 - 15, 2022. ACM 2022, ISBN 978-1-4503-9150-4 [contents] - [i30]Nils Olberg, Sven Seuken:
Enabling Trade-offs in Machine Learning-based Matching for Refugee Resettlement. CoRR abs/2203.16176 (2022) - [i29]Vitor Bosshard, Ye Wang, Sven Seuken:
Non-decreasing Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR abs/2206.03857 (2022) - [i28]Jakob Weissteiner, Jakob Heiss, Julien Siems, Sven Seuken:
Bayesian Optimization-based Combinatorial Assignment. CoRR abs/2208.14698 (2022) - [i27]Ermis Soumalias, Behnoosh Zamanlooy, Jakob Weissteiner, Sven Seuken:
Machine Learning-powered Course Allocation. CoRR abs/2210.00954 (2022) - 2021
- [j6]Ludwig Dierks, Ian A. Kash, Sven Seuken:
On the Cluster Admission Problem for Cloud Computing. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 71: 1-40 (2021) - [j5]Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken:
Partial strategyproofness: Relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem. J. Econ. Theory 191: 105144 (2021) - [c48]Manuel Beyeler, Gianluca Brero, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken:
iMLCA: Machine Learning-powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Interval Bidding. EC 2021: 136 - [c47]Vitor Bosshard, Sven Seuken:
The Cost of Simple Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions. EC 2021: 157 - [i26]Jakob Heiss, Jakob Weissteiner, Hanna Wutte, Sven Seuken, Josef Teichmann:
NOMU: Neural Optimization-based Model Uncertainty. CoRR abs/2102.13640 (2021) - [i25]Nils Olberg, Ludwig Dierks, Sven Seuken, Vincent W. Slaugh, M. Utku Ünver:
Search and Matching for Adoption from Foster Care. CoRR abs/2103.10145 (2021) - [i24]Vitor Bosshard, Sven Seuken:
Shapley-Based Core-Selecting Payment Rules. CoRR abs/2107.01048 (2021) - [i23]Jakob Weissteiner, Jakob Heiss, Julien Siems, Sven Seuken:
Monotone-Value Neural Networks: Exploiting Preference Monotonicity in Combinatorial Assignment. CoRR abs/2109.15117 (2021) - [i22]Sven Seuken, Paul Friedrich, Ludwig Dierks:
Market Design for Drone Traffic Management. CoRR abs/2110.13784 (2021) - 2020
- [j4]Vitor Bosshard, Benedikt Bünz, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken:
Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Verification. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 69: 531-570 (2020) - [j3]Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken, Stefano Battiston:
Default Ambiguity: Credit Default Swaps Create New Systemic Risks in Financial Networks. Manag. Sci. 66(5): 1981-1998 (2020) - [c46]Jakob Weissteiner, Sven Seuken:
Deep Learning-Powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions. AAAI 2020: 2284-2293 - [c45]Ludwig Dierks, Sven Seuken:
The Competitive Effects of Variance-based Pricing. IJCAI 2020: 362-370 - [c44]Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken:
Portfolio Compression in Financial Networks: Incentives and Systemic Risk. EC 2020: 79 - [i21]Ludwig Dierks, Sven Seuken:
The Competitive Effects of Variance-based Pricing. CoRR abs/2001.11769 (2020) - [i20]Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken:
Local Sufficiency for Partial Strategyproofness. CoRR abs/2007.07088 (2020) - [i19]Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken:
Two New Impossibility Results for the Random Assignment Problem. CoRR abs/2007.07100 (2020) - [i18]Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken:
An Axiomatic Decomposition of Strategyproofness for Ordinal Mechanism with Indifferences. CoRR abs/2007.07104 (2020) - [i17]Ludwig Dierks, Sven Seuken:
Revenue Maximization for Consumer Software: Subscription or Perpetual License? CoRR abs/2007.11331 (2020) - [i16]Jakob Weissteiner, Chris Wendler, Sven Seuken, Benjamin Lubin, Markus Püschel:
Fourier Analysis-based Iterative Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR abs/2009.10749 (2020) - [i15]Manuel Beyeler, Gianluca Brero, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken:
Machine Learning-powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Interval Bidding. CoRR abs/2009.13605 (2020) - [i14]Vitor Bosshard, Sven Seuken:
The Cost of Simple Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR abs/2011.12237 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [c43]Gianluca Brero, Sébastien Lahaie, Sven Seuken:
Fast Iterative Combinatorial Auctions via Bayesian Learning. AAAI 2019: 1820-1828 - [c42]Ludwig Dierks, Sven Seuken:
Cloud Pricing: The Spot Market Strikes Back. EC 2019: 593 - [c41]Ludwig Dierks, Ian A. Kash, Sven Seuken:
On the cluster admission problem for cloud computing. NetEcon@SIGMETRICS 2019: 8:1-8:6 - [i13]Jakob Weissteiner, Sven Seuken:
Deep Learning-powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR abs/1907.05771 (2019) - [i12]Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken:
Monotonic and Non-Monotonic Solution Concepts for Generalized Circuits. CoRR abs/1907.12854 (2019) - [i11]Gianluca Brero, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken:
Machine Learning-powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR abs/1911.08042 (2019) - 2018
- [c40]Vitor Bosshard, Ye Wang, Sven Seuken:
Non-decreasing Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions. IJCAI 2018: 105-113 - [c39]Gianluca Brero, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken:
Combinatorial Auctions via Machine Learning-based Preference Elicitation. IJCAI 2018: 128-136 - [c38]Tobias Grubenmann, Daniele Dell'Aglio, Abraham Bernstein, Dmitry Moor, Sven Seuken:
Make Restaurants Pay Your Server Bills. ISWC (P&D/Industry/BlueSky) 2018 - [c37]Benedikt Bünz, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken:
Designing Core-selecting Payment Rules: A Computational Search Approach. EC 2018: 109 - [c36]Umut Mert Dur, Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken:
First-Choice Maximal and First-Choice Stable School Choice Mechanisms. EC 2018: 251-268 - [c35]Tobias Grubenmann, Abraham Bernstein, Dmitry Moor, Sven Seuken:
Financing the Web of Data with Delayed-Answer Auctions. WWW 2018: 1033-1042 - [i10]Ludwig Dierks, Ian A. Kash, Sven Seuken:
The Power of Machine Learning and Market Design for Cloud Computing Admission Control. CoRR abs/1804.07571 (2018) - [i9]Tobias Grubenmann, Abraham Bernstein, Dmitry Moor, Sven Seuken:
FedMark: A Marketplace for Federated Data on the Web. CoRR abs/1808.06298 (2018) - [i8]Gianluca Brero, Sébastien Lahaie, Sven Seuken:
Fast Iterative Combinatorial Auctions via Bayesian Learning. CoRR abs/1809.05340 (2018) - [i7]Vitor Bosshard, Benedikt Bünz, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken:
Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Verification. CoRR abs/1812.01955 (2018) - 2017
- [c34]Gianluca Brero, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken:
Probably Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions via Machine Learning. AAAI 2017: 397-405 - [c33]Michael Weiss, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken:
SATS: A Universal Spectrum Auction Test Suite. AAMAS 2017: 51-59 - [c32]Mike Shann, Alper T. Alan, Sven Seuken, Enrico Costanza, Sarvapali D. Ramchurn:
Save Money or Feel Cozy?: A Field Experiment Evaluation of a Smart Thermostat that Learns Heating Preferences. AAMAS 2017: 1008-1016 - [c31]Vitor Bosshard, Benedikt Bünz, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken:
Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Continuous Value and Action Spaces. IJCAI 2017: 119-127 - [c30]Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken, Stefano Battiston:
Finding Clearing Payments in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps is PPAD-complete. ITCS 2017: 32:1-32:20 - [c29]Tobias Grubenmann, Abraham Bernstein, Dmitry Moor, Sven Seuken:
Challenges of Source Selection in the WoD. ISWC (1) 2017: 313-328 - [c28]Tobias Grubenmann, Daniele Dell'Aglio, Abraham Bernstein, Dmitry Moor, Sven Seuken:
Decentralizing the Semantic Web: Who Will Pay to Realize It? DeSemWeb@ISWC 2017 - [i6]Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken, Stefano Battiston:
The Computational Complexity of Clearing Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps. CoRR abs/1710.01578 (2017) - 2016
- [c27]Brandon K. Liu, David C. Parkes, Sven Seuken:
Personalized Hitting Time for Informative Trust Mechanisms Despite Sybils. AAMAS 2016: 1124-1132 - [c26]Alper T. Alan, Mike Shann, Enrico Costanza, Sarvapali D. Ramchurn, Sven Seuken:
It is too Hot: An In-Situ Study of Three Designs for Heating. CHI 2016: 5262-5273 - [c25]Dmitry Moor, Sven Seuken, Tobias Grubenmann, Abraham Bernstein:
Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions with Uncertain Availability of Goods. IJCAI 2016: 424-432 - [c24]Steffen Schuldenzucker, Sven Seuken, Stefano Battiston:
Clearing Payments in Financial Networks with Credit Default Swaps [Extended Abstract]. EC 2016: 759 - [c23]Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken:
The Pareto Frontier for Random Mechanisms. EC 2016: 769 - 2015
- [c22]Benedikt Bünz, Sven Seuken, Benjamin Lubin:
A Faster Core Constraint Generation Algorithm for Combinatorial Auctions. AAAI 2015: 827-834 - [c21]Timo Mennle, Michael Weiss, Basil Philipp, Sven Seuken:
The Power of Local Manipulation Strategies in Assignment Mechanisms. IJCAI 2015: 82-89 - [i5]Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken:
The Efficient Frontier in Randomized Social Choice. CoRR abs/1502.05883 (2015) - 2014
- [j2]Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken:
Relaxing strategyproofness in one-sided matching. SIGecom Exch. 13(1): 64-67 (2014) - [c20]Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes:
Sybil-proof accounting mechanisms with transitive trust. AAMAS 2014: 205-212 - [c19]Mike Shann, Sven Seuken:
Adaptive home heating under weather and price uncertainty using GPS and mdps. AAMAS 2014: 821-828 - [c18]Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken:
An axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one-sided matching mechanisms. EC 2014: 37-38 - [i4]Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken:
An Axiomatic Approach to Characterizing and Relaxing Strategyproofness of One-sided Matching Mechanisms. CoRR abs/1401.3675 (2014) - [i3]Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken:
The Naive versus the Adaptive Boston Mechanism. CoRR abs/1406.3327 (2014) - 2013
- [c17]Mike Shann, Sven Seuken:
An Active Learning Approach to Home Heating in the Smart Grid. IJCAI 2013: 2892-2899 - [i2]Timo Mennle, Sven Seuken:
Partially Strategyproof Mechanisms for the Assignment Problem. CoRR abs/1303.2558 (2013) - 2012
- [c16]Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes, Eric Horvitz, Kamal Jain, Mary Czerwinski, Desney S. Tan:
Market user interface design. EC 2012: 898-915 - [i1]Sven Seuken, Shlomo Zilberstein:
Improved Memory-Bounded Dynamic Programming for Decentralized POMDPs. CoRR abs/1206.5295 (2012) - 2011
- [c15]Jens Witkowski, Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes:
Incentive-Compatible Escrow Mechanisms. AAAI 2011: 751-757 - [c14]Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes, Eric Horvitz, Kamal Jain, Mary Czerwinski, Desney S. Tan:
Market User Interface Design - (Extended Abstract). AMMA 2011: 2-4 - [c13]Mike Ruberry, Sven Seuken:
Sharing in BitTorrent Can Be Rational - (Extended Abstract). AMMA 2011: 34-35 - 2010
- [c12]Sven Seuken, Jie Tang, David C. Parkes:
Accounting Mechanisms for Distributed Work Systems. AAAI 2010: 860-866 - [c11]Sven Seuken, Kamal Jain, David C. Parkes:
Hidden Market Design. AAAI 2010: 1498-1503 - [c10]Jie Tang, Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes:
Hybrid transitive trust mechanisms. AAMAS 2010: 233-240 - [c9]Sven Seuken:
Hidden market design. AAMAS 2010: 1661-1662 - [c8]Sven Seuken, Kamal Jain, Desney S. Tan, Mary Czerwinski:
Hidden markets: UI design for a P2P backup application. CHI 2010: 315-324 - [c7]Sven Seuken, Denis Xavier Charles, Max Chickering, Sidd Puri:
Market design & analysis for a P2P backup system. EC 2010: 97-108
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [c6]Sven Seuken, Denis Xavier Charles, Max Chickering, Sidd Puri:
Market Design for a P2P Backup System. AMMA 2009: 55-57 - 2008
- [j1]Sven Seuken, Shlomo Zilberstein:
Formal models and algorithms for decentralized decision making under uncertainty. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 17(2): 190-250 (2008) - [c5]Sven Seuken, Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes:
Partially Synchronized DEC-MDPs in Dynamic Mechanism Design. AAAI 2008: 162-169 - [c4]Mark Klein, Gabriel A. Moreno, David C. Parkes, Daniel Plakosh, Sven Seuken, Kurt C. Wallnau:
Handling interdependent values in an auction mechanism for bandwidth allocation in tactical data networks. NetEcon 2008: 73-78 - 2007
- [c3]Sven Seuken, Shlomo Zilberstein:
Memory-Bounded Dynamic Programming for DEC-POMDPs. IJCAI 2007: 2009-2015 - [c2]Sven Seuken, Shlomo Zilberstein:
Improved Memory-Bounded Dynamic Programming for Decentralized POMDPs. UAI 2007: 344-351 - 2004
- [c1]Günter Müller, Torsten Eymann, Norbert Nopper, Sven Seuken:
EMIKA system: architecture and prototypic realization. SMC (6) 2004: 5621-5626
Coauthor Index
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last updated on 2024-10-28 20:15 CET by the dblp team
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