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Christos-Alexandros Psomas
Person information
- affiliation: Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA
Other persons with the same name
- Alexandros Psomas 0002 — National Technical University of Athens, Greece
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2020 – today
- 2024
- [j8]Gerdus Benadè, Aleksandr M. Kazachkov, Ariel D. Procaccia, Christos-Alexandros Psomas, David Zeng:
Fair and Efficient Online Allocations. Oper. Res. 72(4): 1438-1452 (2024) - [j7]Thomas Kesselheim, Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Shai Vardi:
Technical Note - On Hiring Secretaries with Stochastic Departures. Oper. Res. 72(5): 2076-2081 (2024) - [c37]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Xizhi Tan, Paritosh Verma:
Getting More by Knowing Less: Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Fair Division. IJCAI 2024: 2807-2815 - [c36]Tiantian Gong, Ryan Henry, Alexandros Psomas, Aniket Kate:
More is Merrier: Relax the Non-Collusion Assumption in Multi-Server PIR. SP 2024: 4348-4366 - [i31]Owen Eckart, Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma:
On the Fairness of Normalized p-Means for Allocating Goods and Chores. CoRR abs/2402.14996 (2024) - [i30]Marios Mertzanidis, Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma:
Automating Food Drop: The Power of Two Choices for Dynamic and Fair Food Allocation. CoRR abs/2406.06363 (2024) - [i29]Kshipra Bhawalkar, Marios Mertzanidis, Divyarthi Mohan, Alexandros Psomas:
Mechanism Design via the Interim Relaxation. CoRR abs/2407.12699 (2024) - [i28]Tiantian Gong, Aniket Kate, Alexandros Psomas, Athina Terzoglou:
V3rified: Revelation vs Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Decentralized Verifiable Computation. CoRR abs/2408.07177 (2024) - [i27]Gagan Aggarwal, Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas, Di Wang:
Mechanism Design with Delegated Bidding. CoRR abs/2409.19087 (2024) - 2023
- [c35]Easwar Vivek Mangipudi, Donghang Lu, Alexandros Psomas, Aniket Kate:
Collusion-Deterrent Threshold Information Escrow. CSF 2023: 584-599 - [c34]Christos Boutsikas, Petros Drineas, Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma:
Refined Mechanism Design for Approximately Structured Priors via Active Regression. NeurIPS 2023 - [c33]Anuran Makur, Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas, Athina Terzoglou:
On the Robustness of Mechanism Design under Total Variation Distance. NeurIPS 2023 - [c32]Bailey Flanigan, Daniel Halpern, Alexandros Psomas:
Smoothed Analysis of Social Choice Revisited. WINE 2023: 290-309 - [i26]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Xizhi Tan, Paritosh Verma:
Getting More by Knowing Less: Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Fair Division. CoRR abs/2306.02040 (2023) - [i25]Kamyar Azizzadenesheli, Trung Dang, Aranyak Mehta, Alexandros Psomas, Qian Zhang:
Reward Selection with Noisy Observations. CoRR abs/2307.05953 (2023) - [i24]Gerdus Benadè, Daniel Halpern, Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma:
On the Existence of Envy-Free Allocations Beyond Additive Valuations. CoRR abs/2307.09648 (2023) - [i23]Rohan Garg, Alexandros Psomas:
Fairly Allocating Goods in Parallel. CoRR abs/2309.08685 (2023) - [i22]Anuran Makur, Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas, Athina Terzoglou:
On the Robustness of Mechanism Design under Total Variation Distance. CoRR abs/2310.07809 (2023) - [i21]Christos Boutsikas, Petros Drineas, Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma:
Refined Mechanism Design for Approximately Structured Priors via Active Regression. CoRR abs/2310.07874 (2023) - 2022
- [j6]Christos H. Papadimitriou, George Pierrakos, Alexandros Psomas, Aviad Rubinstein:
On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design. Games Econ. Behav. 134: 399-427 (2022) - [j5]Shai Vardi, Alexandros Psomas, Eric J. Friedman:
Dynamic Fair Resource Division. Math. Oper. Res. 47(2): 945-968 (2022) - [j4]Siqi Liu, J. Benjamin Miller, Alexandros Psomas:
Risk-Robust Mechanism Design for a Prospect-Theoretic Buyer. Theory Comput. Syst. 66(3): 616-644 (2022) - [c31]Ioannis Caragiannis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Daniel Schoepflin:
Beyond Cake Cutting: Allocating Homogeneous Divisible Goods. AAMAS 2022: 208-216 - [c30]Evgenios M. Kornaropoulos, Nathaniel Moyer, Charalampos Papamanthou, Alexandros Psomas:
Leakage Inversion: Towards Quantifying Privacy in Searchable Encryption. CCS 2022: 1829-1842 - [c29]Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma:
Fair and Efficient Allocations Without Obvious Manipulations. NeurIPS 2022 - [c28]Gagan Aggarwal, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Aranyak Mehta, Divyarthi Mohan, Alexandros Psomas:
Simple Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization in Rich Advertising Auctions. NeurIPS 2022 - [c27]Gerdus Benadè, Daniel Halpern, Alexandros Psomas:
Dynamic Fair Division with Partial Information. NeurIPS 2022 - [c26]Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg:
On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms. NeurIPS 2022 - [i20]Ioannis Caragiannis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Daniel Schoepflin:
Beyond Cake Cutting: Allocating Homogeneous Divisible Goods. CoRR abs/2201.04662 (2022) - [i19]Tiantian Gong, Ryan Henry, Alex Psomas, Aniket Kate:
Relax the Non-Collusion Assumption for Multi-Server PIR. CoRR abs/2201.07740 (2022) - [i18]Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg:
On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms. CoRR abs/2205.13039 (2022) - [i17]Gagan Aggarwal, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Aranyak Mehta, Divyarthi Mohan, Alexandros Psomas:
Simple Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization in Rich Advertising Auctions. CoRR abs/2206.02948 (2022) - [i16]Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma:
Fair and Efficient Allocations Without Obvious Manipulations. CoRR abs/2206.11143 (2022) - [i15]Bailey Flanigan, Daniel Halpern, Alexandros Psomas:
Smoothed Analysis of Social Choice Revisited. CoRR abs/2206.14684 (2022) - 2021
- [c25]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Xizhi Tan:
Fair and Efficient Online Allocations with Normalized Valuations. AAAI 2021: 5440-5447 - [c24]Martin Hoefer, Pasin Manurangsi, Alexandros Psomas:
Algorithmic Persuasion with Evidence. ITCS 2021: 3:1-3:20 - 2020
- [j3]Nikhil R. Devanur, Nima Haghpanah, Alexandros Psomas:
Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands. Games Econ. Behav. 121: 482-505 (2020) - [c23]Aranyak Mehta, Uri Nadav, Alexandros Psomas, Aviad Rubinstein:
Hitting the High Notes: Subset Selection for Maximizing Expected Order Statistics. NeurIPS 2020 - [c22]Dominik Peters, Ariel D. Procaccia, Alexandros Psomas, Zixin Zhou:
Explainable Voting. NeurIPS 2020 - [c21]David Zeng, Alexandros Psomas:
Fairness-Efficiency Tradeoffs in Dynamic Fair Division. EC 2020: 911-912 - [c20]Daniel Halpern, Ariel D. Procaccia, Alexandros Psomas, Nisarg Shah:
Fair Division with Binary Valuations: One Rule to Rule Them All. WINE 2020: 370-383 - [i14]Daniel Halpern, Ariel D. Procaccia, Alexandros Psomas, Nisarg Shah:
Fair Division with Binary Valuations: One Rule to Rule Them All. CoRR abs/2007.06073 (2020) - [i13]Martin Hoefer, Pasin Manurangsi, Alexandros Psomas:
Algorithmic Persuasion with Evidence. CoRR abs/2008.12626 (2020) - [i12]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Xizhi Tan:
Fair and Efficient Online Allocations with Normalized Valuations. CoRR abs/2009.12405 (2020) - [i11]Aranyak Mehta, Uri Nadav, Alexandros Psomas, Aviad Rubinstein:
Hitting the High Notes: Subset Selection for Maximizing Expected Order Statistics. CoRR abs/2012.07935 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [j2]Frank Ban, Kamal Jain, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Aviad Rubinstein:
Reductions in PPP. Inf. Process. Lett. 145: 48-52 (2019) - [j1]Min Kyung Lee, Daniel Kusbit, Anson Kahng, Ji Tae Kim, Xinran Yuan, Allissa Chan, Daniel See, Ritesh Noothigattu, Siheon Lee, Alexandros Psomas, Ariel D. Procaccia:
WeBuildAI: Participatory Framework for Algorithmic Governance. Proc. ACM Hum. Comput. Interact. 3(CSCW): 181:1-181:35 (2019) - [c19]Eric J. Friedman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Scott Shenker:
Fair and Efficient Memory Sharing: Confronting Free Riders. AAAI 2019: 1965-1972 - [c18]Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values. EC 2019: 417-418 - [c17]Jonah Brown-Cohen, Arvind Narayanan, Alexandros Psomas, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols. EC 2019: 459-473 - [c16]Anson Kahng, Min Kyung Lee, Ritesh Noothigattu, Ariel D. Procaccia, Christos-Alexandros Psomas:
Statistical Foundations of Virtual Democracy. ICML 2019: 3173-3182 - [c15]Jiafan He, Ariel D. Procaccia, Alexandros Psomas, David Zeng:
Achieving a Fairer Future by Changing the Past. IJCAI 2019: 343-349 - [c14]Siqi Liu, J. Benjamin Miller, Alexandros Psomas:
Risk Robust Mechanism Design for a Prospect Theoretic Buyer. SAGT 2019: 95-108 - [c13]Shaddin Dughmi, Rad Niazadeh, Alexandros Psomas, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of Duality. WINE 2019: 142-155 - [c12]Thomas Kesselheim, Alexandros Psomas, Shai Vardi:
How to Hire Secretaries with Stochastic Departures. WINE 2019: 343 - [i10]David Zeng, Alexandros Psomas:
Fairness-Efficiency Tradeoffs in Dynamic Fair Division. CoRR abs/1907.11672 (2019) - [i9]Thomas Kesselheim, Alexandros Psomas, Shai Vardi:
How to Hire Secretaries with Stochastic Departures. CoRR abs/1909.08660 (2019) - [i8]Shaddin Dughmi, Rad Niazadeh, Alexandros Psomas, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of Duality. CoRR abs/1909.10584 (2019) - 2018
- [c11]Georgios Amanatidis, George Christodoulou, John Fearnley, Evangelos Markakis, Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Eftychia Vakaliou:
An Improved Envy-Free Cake Cutting Protocol for Four Agents. SAGT 2018: 87-99 - [c10]Gerdus Benade, Aleksandr M. Kazachkov, Ariel D. Procaccia, Christos-Alexandros Psomas:
How to Make Envy Vanish Over Time. EC 2018: 593-610 - [c9]Siqi Liu, Christos-Alexandros Psomas:
On the Competition Complexity of Dynamic Mechanism Design. SODA 2018: 2008-2025 - [i7]Georgios Amanatidis, George Christodoulou, John Fearnley, Evangelos Markakis, Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Eftychia Vakaliou:
An Improved Envy-Free Cake Cutting Protocol for Four Agents. CoRR abs/1807.00317 (2018) - [i6]Jonah Brown-Cohen, Arvind Narayanan, Christos-Alexandros Psomas, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols. CoRR abs/1809.06528 (2018) - [i5]Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values. CoRR abs/1811.12459 (2018) - 2017
- [b1]Christos-Alexandros Psomas:
Algorithmic Mechanism Design in Dynamic Environments. University of California, Berkeley, USA, 2017 - [c8]Nikhil R. Devanur, Nima Haghpanah, Christos-Alexandros Psomas:
Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands. EC 2017: 41-42 - [c7]Eric J. Friedman, Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Shai Vardi:
Controlled Dynamic Fair Division. EC 2017: 461-478 - [i4]Nikhil R. Devanur, Nima Haghpanah, Christos-Alexandros Psomas:
Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands. CoRR abs/1704.05027 (2017) - [i3]Siqi Liu, Christos-Alexandros Psomas:
On the Competition Complexity of Dynamic Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/1709.07955 (2017) - 2016
- [c6]Christos H. Papadimitriou, George Pierrakos, Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Aviad Rubinstein:
On the Complexity of Dynamic Mechanism Design. SODA 2016: 1458-1475 - [c5]Nikhil R. Devanur, Zhiyi Huang, Christos-Alexandros Psomas:
The sample complexity of auctions with side information. STOC 2016: 426-439 - 2015
- [c4]Eric J. Friedman, Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Shai Vardi:
Dynamic Fair Division with Minimal Disruptions. EC 2015: 697-713 - [i2]Nikhil R. Devanur, Zhiyi Huang, Christos-Alexandros Psomas:
The Sample Complexity of Auctions with Side Information. CoRR abs/1511.02296 (2015) - 2014
- [c3]Eric J. Friedman, Ali Ghodsi, Christos-Alexandros Psomas:
Strategyproof allocation of discrete jobs on multiple machines. EC 2014: 529-546 - [i1]Christos H. Papadimitriou, George Pierrakos, Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Aviad Rubinstein:
The Intractability of Dynamic Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/1407.5373 (2014) - 2012
- [c2]Sergios Petridis, Christos-Alexandros Psomas:
Probabilistic Extension of Allen's Relations Using the Hourglass Model. ICTAI 2012: 1106-1111 - 2011
- [c1]Evangelos Markakis, Christos-Alexandros Psomas:
On Worst-Case Allocations in the Presence of Indivisible Goods. WINE 2011: 278-289
Coauthor Index
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