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ORCIDY. Narahari
Yadati Narahari
Person information
- affiliation: Indian Institute of Science, Department of Computer Science and Automation, Bangalore, India
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2020 – today
- 2024
[i54]V. Udaya Sankar, Vishisht Srihari Rao, Y. Narahari:
Deep Learning Meets Mechanism Design: Key Results and Some Novel Applications. CoRR abs/2401.05683 (2024)- 2023
- [c124]Gogulapati Sreedurga, Soumyarup Sadhukhan, Souvik Roy, Yadati Narahari:
Individual-Fair and Group-Fair Social Choice Rules under Single-Peaked Preferences. AAMAS 2023: 2872-2874 - [c123]Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Bazil Ahmed, Prathik Diwakar, Ganesh Ghalme, Y. Narahari:
Designing Fair, Cost-Optimal Auctions Based on Deep Learning for Procuring Agricultural Inputs Through Farmer Collectives. CASE 2023: 1-8 - [c122]Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Abhishek Chaudhary, Inavamsi Enaganti, Kartik Sagar, Y. Narahari:
A Decision Support Tool for District Level Planning of Agricultural Crops for Maximizing Profits of Farmers. CASE 2023: 1-6 - [c121]Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Jaydeep Pawar, Abhijnya Bhat, Deepanshu, Inavamsi Enaganti, Kartik Sagar, Y. Narahari:
An Innovative Deep Learning Based Approach for Accurate Agricultural Crop Price Prediction. CASE 2023: 1-7 - [e3]Mingyu Feng, Tanja Käser, Partha P. Talukdar, Rakesh Agrawal, Y. Narahari, Mykola Pechenizkiy:
Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Educational Data Mining, EDM 2023, Bengaluru, India, July 11-14, 2023. International Educational Data Mining Society 2023 [contents] - [i53]Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Bazil Ahmed, Prathik Diwakar, Ganesh Ghalme, Y. Narahari:
Designing Fair, Cost-optimal Auctions based on Deep Learning for Procuring Agricultural Inputs through Farmer Collectives. CoRR abs/2304.07341 (2023) - [i52]Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Jaydeep Pawar, Abhijnya Bhat, Deepanshu, Inavamsi Enaganti, Kartik Sagar, Y. Narahari:
An innovative Deep Learning Based Approach for Accurate Agricultural Crop Price Prediction. CoRR abs/2304.09761 (2023) - 2022
- [j40]Divya Padmanabhan
, Satyanath Bhat, Prabuchandran K. J., Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari:
Dominant strategy truthful, deterministic multi-armed bandit mechanisms with logarithmic regret for sponsored search auctions. Appl. Intell. 52(3): 3209-3226 (2022) - [c120]Shivika Narang, Arpita Biswas, Yadati Narahari:
On Achieving Leximin Fairness and Stability in Many-to-One Matchings. AAMAS 2022: 1705-1707 - [c119]Rohit Patel, Inavamsi Enaganti, Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Y. Narahari:
A Data-Driven, Farmer-Oriented Agricultural Crop Recommendation Engine (ACRE). BDA 2022: 227-248 - [c118]Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Azal Fatima, Inavamsi Enaganti, Yadati Narahari:
Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Efficient Procurement of Agricultural Inputs for Farmers through Farmer Collectives. COMPASS 2022: 696-700 - [c117]Siddharth Barman, Anand Krishna, Yadati Narahari, Soumyarup Sadhukhan:
Achieving Envy-Freeness with Limited Subsidies under Dichotomous Valuations. IJCAI 2022: 60-66 - [c116]Gogulapati Sreedurga, Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Yadati Narahari:
Maxmin Participatory Budgeting. IJCAI 2022: 489-495 - [c115]Siddharth Barman, Anand Krishna, Y. Narahari, Soumyarup Sadhukhan:
Nash Welfare Guarantees for Fair and Efficient Coverage. WINE 2022: 256-272 - [i51]Siddharth Barman, Anand Krishna, Y. Narahari, Soumyarup Sadhukhan:
Achieving Envy-Freeness with Limited Subsidies under Dichotomous Valuations. CoRR abs/2201.07419 (2022) - [i50]Gogulapati Sreedurga, Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Y. Narahari:
Maxmin Participatory Budgeting. CoRR abs/2204.13923 (2022) - [i49]Siddharth Barman, Anand Krishna, Y. Narahari, Soumyarup Sadhukhan:
Nash Welfare Guarantees for Fair and Efficient Coverage. CoRR abs/2207.01970 (2022) - [i48]Gogulapati Sreedurga, Yadati Narahari:
Indivisible Participatory Budgeting under Weak Rankings. CoRR abs/2207.07981 (2022) - [i47]Gogulapati Sreedurga, Soumyarup Sadhukhan, Souvik Roy, Yadati Narahari:
Characterization of Group-Fair Social Choice Rules under Single-Peaked Preferences. CoRR abs/2207.07984 (2022) - [i46]Amal Roy, Chandramani Singh, Y. Narahari:
Recent Advances in Modeling and Control of Epidemics using a Mean Field Approach. CoRR abs/2208.14765 (2022) - 2021
- [j39]Ganesh Ghalme, Swapnil Dhamal, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
Ballooning multi-armed bandits. Artif. Intell. 296: 103485 (2021) - [j38]Vishakha Patil, Ganesh Ghalme, Vineet Nair, Y. Narahari:
Achieving Fairness in the Stochastic Multi-Armed Bandit Problem. J. Mach. Learn. Res. 22: 174:1-174:31 (2021) - [i45]Kumar Abhishek, Ganesh Ghalme, Sujit Gujar, Yadati Narahari:
Sleeping Combinatorial Bandits. CoRR abs/2106.01624 (2021) - [i44]Rohith Dwarakanath Vallam, Priyanka Bhatt, Debmalya Mandal, Y. Narahari:
Improving Teacher-Student Interactions in Online Educational Forums using a Markov Chain based Stackelberg Game Model. CoRR abs/2112.01239 (2021) - 2020
- [c114]Vishakha Patil, Ganesh Ghalme, Vineet Nair, Y. Narahari:
Achieving Fairness in the Stochastic Multi-Armed Bandit Problem. AAAI 2020: 5379-5386 - [c113]Ganesh Ghalme, Swapnil Dhamal, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
Ballooning Multi-Armed Bandits. AAMAS 2020: 1849-1851 - [c112]Shivika Narang, Yadati Narahari:
A Study of Incentive Compatibility and Stability Issues in Fractional Matchings. AAMAS 2020: 1951-1953 - [i43]Shivika Narang, Y. Narahari:
A Study of Incentive Compatibility and Stability Issues in Fractional Matchings. CoRR abs/2001.05652 (2020) - [i42]Ganesh Ghalme, Swapnil Dhamal, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
Ballooning Multi-Armed Bandits. CoRR abs/2001.10055 (2020) - [i41]Shivika Narang, Arpita Biswas, Y. Narahari:
On Achieving Fairness and Stability in Many-to-One Matchings. CoRR abs/2009.05823 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [j37]Satyanath Bhat, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
An optimal bidimensional multi-armed bandit auction for multi-unit procurement. Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. 85(1): 1-19 (2019) - [j36]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Parameterized dichotomy of choosing committees based on approval votes in the presence of outliers. Theor. Comput. Sci. 783: 53-70 (2019) - [j35]Swapnil Dhamal, Rohith Dwarakanath Vallam, Y. Narahari:
Modeling Spread of Preferences in Social Networks for Sampling-Based Preference Aggregation. IEEE Trans. Netw. Sci. Eng. 6(1): 46-59 (2019) - [c111]Shivika Narang, Megha Byali, Pankaj Dayama, Vinayaka Pandit, Y. Narahari:
Design of Trusted B2B Market Platforms using Permissioned Blockchains and Game Theory. IEEE ICBC 2019: 385-393 - [i40]Vishakha Patil, Ganesh Ghalme, Vineet Nair, Y. Narahari:
Achieving Fairness in the Stochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problem. CoRR abs/1907.10516 (2019) - 2018
- [j34]Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Satyanath Bhat, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari:
A quality assuring, cost optimal multi-armed bandit mechanism for expertsourcing. Artif. Intell. 254: 44-63 (2018) - [j33]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting. Theor. Comput. Sci. 726: 78-99 (2018) - [c110]Siddharth Barman, Arpita Biswas, Sanath Kumar Krishna Murthy, Yadati Narahari:
Groupwise Maximin Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods. AAAI 2018: 917-924 - [c109]Ganesh Ghalme, Sujit Gujar, Amleshwar Kumar, Shweta Jain, Y. Narahari:
Design of Coalition Resistant Credit Score Functions for Online Discussion Forums. AAMAS 2018: 95-103 - 2017
- [j32]Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari:
Multi-Label Classification from Multiple Noisy Sources Using Topic Models. Inf. 8(2): 52 (2017) - [j31]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Frugal bribery in voting. Theor. Comput. Sci. 676: 15-32 (2017) - [c108]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Parameterized Dichotomy of Choosing Committees Based on Approval Votes in the Presence of Outliers. AAMAS 2017: 42-50 - [c107]Ganesh Ghalme, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
Thompson Sampling Based Mechanisms for Stochastic Multi-Armed Bandit Problems. AAMAS 2017: 87-95 - [c106]Praphul Chandra, Sujit Gujar, Yadati Narahari:
Referral-Embedded Provision Point Mechanisms for Crowdfunding of Public Projects. AAMAS 2017: 642-650 - [c105]Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Prabuchandran K. J., Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari:
A Dominant Strategy Truthful, Deterministic Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanism with Logarithmic Regret. AAMAS 2017: 1667-1669 - [c104]Sneha Mondal, Swapnil Dhamal, Y. Narahari:
Two-Phase Influence Maximization in Social Networks with Seed Nodes and Referral Incentives. ICWSM 2017: 620-623 - [c103]Aritra Chatterjee, Ganesh Ghalme, Shweta Jain, Rohit Vaish, Y. Narahari:
Analysis of Thompson Sampling for Stochastic Sleeping Bandits. UAI 2017 - [i39]Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Prabuchandran K. J., Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari:
A Dominant Strategy Truthful, Deterministic Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanism with Logarithmic Regret. CoRR abs/1703.00632 (2017) - [i38]D. Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan, Y. Narahari:
On Optimal Mechanisms in the Two-Item Single-Buyer Unit-Demand Setting. CoRR abs/1705.01821 (2017) - [i37]Swapnil Dhamal, Prabuchandran K. J., Y. Narahari:
Information Diffusion in Social Networks in Two Phases. CoRR abs/1706.07739 (2017) - [i36]Swapnil Dhamal, Y. Narahari:
Formation of Stable Strategic Networks with Desired Topologies. CoRR abs/1706.10215 (2017) - [i35]Swapnil Dhamal, Rohith Dwarakanath Vallam, Y. Narahari:
Modeling Spread of Preferences in Social Networks for Sampling-based Preference Aggregation. CoRR abs/1708.05690 (2017) - [i34]Siddharth Barman, Arpita Biswas, Sanath Kumar Krishna Murthy, Y. Narahari:
Groupwise Maximin Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods. CoRR abs/1711.07621 (2017) - 2016
- [j30]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting. Theor. Comput. Sci. 616: 111-125 (2016) - [j29]Swapnil Dhamal, Prabuchandran K. J., Y. Narahari:
Information Diffusion in Social Networks in Two Phases. IEEE Trans. Netw. Sci. Eng. 3(4): 197-210 (2016) - [c102]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Frugal Bribery in Voting. AAAI 2016: 2466-2472 - [c101]Shourya Roy, Sandipan Dandapat, Y. Narahari:
A Fluctuation Smoothing Approach for Unsupervised Automatic Short Answer Grading. NLP-TEA@COLING 2016: 82-91 - [c100]Shweta Jain, Ganesh Ghalme, Satyanath Bhat, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
A Deterministic MAB Mechanism for Crowdsourcing with Logarithmic Regret and Immediate Payments. AAMAS 2016: 86-94 - [c99]Satyanath Bhat, Divya Padmanabhan, Shweta Jain, Yadati Narahari:
A Truthful Mechanism with Biparameter Learning for Online Crowdsourcing: (Extended Abstract). AAMAS 2016: 1385-1386 - [c98]Praphul Chandra, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
Crowdfunding Public Projects with Provision Point: A Prediction Market Approach. ECAI 2016: 778-786 - [c97]Shourya Roy, Himanshu S. Bhatt, Y. Narahari:
Transfer Learning for Automatic Short Answer Grading. ECAI 2016: 1622-1623 - [c96]Praphul Chandra, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
Crowdsourced Referral Auctions. ECAI 2016: 1654-1655 - [c95]Shourya Roy, Sandipan Dandapat, Ajay Nagesh, Yadati Narahari:
Wisdom of Students: A Consistent Automatic Short Answer Grading Technique. ICON 2016: 178-187 - [c94]Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari:
Topic Model Based Multi-Label Classification. ICTAI 2016: 996-1003 - [c93]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Complexity of Manipulation with Partial Information in Voting. IJCAI 2016: 229-235 - [c92]Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Dinesh Garg, Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari:
A Robust UCB scheme for active learning in regression from strategic crowds. IJCNN 2016: 2212-2219 - [c91]D. Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan, Y. Narahari:
Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer Having Uniformly Distributed Valuations. WINE 2016: 174-187 - [i33]Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Dinesh Garg, Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari:
A Robust UCB Scheme for Active Learning in Regression from Strategic Crowds. CoRR abs/1601.06750 (2016) - [i32]Satyanath Bhat, Divya Padmanabhan, Shweta Jain, Y. Narahari:
A Truthful Mechanism with Biparameter Learning for Online Crowdsourcing. CoRR abs/1602.04032 (2016) - [i31]Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari:
Topic Model Based Multi-Label Classification from the Crowd. CoRR abs/1604.00783 (2016) - [i30]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Complexity of Manipulation with Partial Information in Voting. CoRR abs/1604.04359 (2016) - [i29]Shourya Roy, Himanshu S. Bhatt, Y. Narahari:
An Iterative Transfer Learning Based Ensemble Technique for Automatic Short Answer Grading. CoRR abs/1609.04909 (2016) - [i28]Praphul Chandra, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
Referral-Embedded Provision Point Mechanisms for Crowdfunding of Public Projects. CoRR abs/1610.01768 (2016) - [i27]D. Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan, Y. Narahari:
Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer Having Uniformly Distributed Valuations. CoRR abs/1610.06718 (2016) - 2015
- [c90]Rohith Dwarakanath Vallam, Priyanka Bhatt, Debmalya Mandal, Y. Narahari:
A Stackelberg Game Approach for Incentivizing Participation in Online Educational Forums with Heterogeneous Student Population. AAAI 2015: 1043-1049 - [c89]Praphul Chandra, Yadati Narahari, Debmalya Mandal, Prasenjit Dey:
Novel Mechanisms for Online Crowdsourcing with Unreliable, Strategic Agents. AAAI 2015: 1256-1262 - [c88]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Kernelization Complexity of Possible Winner and Coalitional Manipulation Problems in Voting. AAMAS 2015: 87-96 - [c87]Pankaj Dayama, Balakrishnan Narayanaswamy, Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari:
Truthful Interval Cover Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Applications. AAMAS 2015: 1091-1099 - [c86]Arpita Biswas, Shweta Jain, Debmalya Mandal, Y. Narahari:
A Truthful Budget Feasible Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Time Critical Tasks. AAMAS 2015: 1101-1109 - [c85]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Detecting Possible Manipulators in Elections. AAMAS 2015: 1441-1450 - [c84]Arupratan Ray, Debmalya Mandal, Yadati Narahari:
Profit Maximizing Prior-free Multi-unit Procurement Auctions with Capacitated Sellers. AAMAS 2015: 1753-1754 - [c83]Swapnil Dhamal, Prabuchandran K. J., Yadati Narahari:
A Multi-phase Approach for Improving Information Diffusion in Social Networks. AAMAS 2015: 1787-1788 - [c82]Satyanath Bhat, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Yadati Narahari:
An Optimal Bidimensional Multi-Armed Bandit Auction for Multi-unit Procurement. AAMAS 2015: 1789-1790 - [c81]S. Prasanna Devi, Y. Narahari, Nukala Viswanadham, S. Vinu Kiran, S. Manivannan:
E-mandi implementation based on gale-shapely algorithm for perishable goods supply chain. CASE 2015: 1421-1426 - [c80]Palash Dey, Y. Narahari:
Estimating the Margin of Victory of an Election Using Sampling. IJCAI 2015: 1120-1126 - [c79]Shourya Roy, Y. Narahari, Om D. Deshmukh:
A Perspective on Computer Assisted Assessment Techniques for Short Free-Text Answers. CAA 2015: 96-109 - [e2]Manish Gupta, Y. Narahari, V. S. Subrahmanian, Indrajit Bhattacharya:
Proceedings of the Second ACM IKDD Conference on Data Sciences, Bangalore, CoDS 2015, India, March 18-21, 2015. ACM 2015, ISBN 978-1-4503-3436-5 [contents] - [e1]Manish Gupta, Y. Narahari, V. S. Subrahmanian, Indrajit Bhattacharya:
Companion Volume to the Proceedings of the 2nd IKDD Conference on Data Sciences, CODS 2015 Companion Volume, Bangalore, India, March 20, 2015. ACM 2015, ISBN 978-1-4503-3616-1 [contents] - [i26]Swapnil Dhamal, Prabuchandran K. J., Y. Narahari:
A Multi-phase Approach for Improving Information Diffusion in Social Networks. CoRR abs/1502.06133 (2015) - [i25]Satyanath Bhat, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
An Optimal Bidimensional Multi-Armed Bandit Auction for Multi-unit Procurement. CoRR abs/1502.06934 (2015) - [i24]Arupratan Ray, Debmalya Mandal, Y. Narahari:
Profit Maximizing Prior-free Multi-unit Procurement Auctions with Capacitated Sellers. CoRR abs/1504.01020 (2015) - [i23]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Frugal Bribery in Voting. CoRR abs/1504.08248 (2015) - [i22]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Manipulation is Harder with Incomplete Votes. CoRR abs/1504.08256 (2015) - [i21]Palash Dey, Y. Narahari:
Estimating the Margin of Victory of an Election using Sampling. CoRR abs/1505.00566 (2015) - [i20]Swaprava Nath, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari, Christopher R. Dance:
Dynamic Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations. CoRR abs/1506.07631 (2015) - [i19]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
On Choosing Committees Based on Approval Votes in the Presence of Outliers. CoRR abs/1511.04190 (2015) - 2014
- [c78]Shweta Jain, Balakrishnan Narayanaswamy, Y. Narahari:
A Multiarmed Bandit Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Demand Response in Smart Grids. AAAI 2014: 721-727 - [c77]Satyanath Bhat, Swaprava Nath, Sujit Gujar, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari, Christopher R. Dance:
A mechanism to optimally balance cost and quality of labeling tasks outsourced to strategic agents. AAMAS 2014: 917-924 - [c76]Palash Dey, Y. Narahari:
Asymptotic collusion-proofness of voting rules: the case of large number of candidates. AAMAS 2014: 1419-1420 - [c75]Debmalya Mandal, Yadati Narahari:
A novel ex-post truthful mechanism for multi-slot sponsored search auctions. AAMAS 2014: 1555-1556 - [c74]Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari:
A quality assuring multi-armed bandit crowdsourcing mechanism with incentive compatible learning. AAMAS 2014: 1609-1610 - [c73]Shantanu Biswas, Deepak Bagchi, Y. Narahari:
Mechanism design for sustainable virtual power plant formation. CASE 2014: 67-72 - [c72]Madhav V. Marathe, Y. Narahari, Ramasuri Narayanam:
Message from social networking workshop chairs. COMSNETS 2014: 1 - [i18]Sujit Gujar, Yadati Narahari:
Redistribution Mechanisms for Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects. CoRR abs/1401.3884 (2014) - [i17]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Detecting Possible Manipulators in Elections. CoRR abs/1404.2367 (2014) - [i16]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Complexity of Kernelization in the Possible Winner Problem. CoRR abs/1405.3865 (2014) - [i15]Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Satyanath Bhat, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari:
An Incentive Compatible Multi-Armed-Bandit Crowdsourcing Mechanism with Quality Assurance. CoRR abs/1406.7157 (2014) - [i14]Swapnil Dhamal, Akanksha Meghlan, Y. Narahari:
Cooperative Game Theoretic Solution Concepts for top-$k$ Problems. CoRR abs/1407.5442 (2014) - 2013
- [j28]Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
Optimal multi-unit combinatorial auctions. Oper. Res. 13(1): 27-46 (2013) - [j27]Vikas K. Garg, Y. Narahari, M. Narasimha Murty:
Novel Biobjective Clustering (BiGC) Based on Cooperative Game Theory. IEEE Trans. Knowl. Data Eng. 25(5): 1070-1082 (2013) - [c71]Ratul Ray, Rohith Dwarakanath Vallam, Y. Narahari:
Eliciting high quality feedback from crowdsourced tree networks using continuous scoring rules. AAMAS 2013: 279-286 - [c70]Chetan Yadati, Dilpreet Kaur, Narayanaswamy Balakrishnan, Avik Sarkar, Y. Narahari:
Incentive compatible mechanisms for power cut allocation in smart grids. CASE 2013: 100-105 - [c69]Deepak Bagchi, Shantanu Biswas, Yadati Narahari, Nukala Viswanadham, P. Suresh, S. V. Subrahmanya:
Incentive compatible green procurement using scoring rules. CASE 2013: 504-509 - [c68]Rohith Dwarakanath Vallam, C. A. Subramanian, Yadati Narahari, Ramasuri Narayanam, Srinath Narasimha:
Topologies of stable strategic networks with localized payoffs. CASE 2013: 844-849 - [c67]Shweta Jain, Narayanaswamy Balakrishnan, Yadati Narahari, Saiful Azmi bin Hj Husain, Voo Nyuk Yoong:
Constrained tâtonnement for fast and incentive compatible distributed demand management in smart grids. e-Energy 2013: 125-136 - [c66]Swapnil Dhamal, Y. Narahari:
Scalable Preference Aggregation in Social Networks. HCOMP 2013: 42-50 - [i13]Palash Dey, Y. Narahari:
Asymptotic Collusion-proofness of Voting Rules when the Number of Candidates is Large. CoRR abs/1305.5053 (2013) - 2012
- [j26]Chaitanya Nittala, Yadati Narahari:
Optimal equilibrium bidding strategies for budget constrained bidders in sponsored search auctions. Oper. Res. 12(3): 317-343 (2012) - [j25]Deepak Bagchi, Shantanu Biswas, Y. Narahari, P. Suresh, L. Udaya Lakshmi, Nukala Viswanadham, S. V. Subrahmanya:
Carbon footprint optimization: game theoretic problems and solutions. SIGecom Exch. 11(1): 34-38 (2012) - [c65]Swaprava Nath, Pankaj Dayama, Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari, James Y. Zou:
Threats and Trade-Offs in Resource Critical Crowdsourcing Tasks Over Networks. AAAI 2012: 2447-2448 - [c64]